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Abstract—Physical Unclonable Functions evaluate manufac-
turing variations to generate secure cryptographic keys for
embedded systems without secure key storage. It is explained
how methods from coding theory are applied in order to ensure
reliable key reproduction. We show how better results can be
obtained using code classes and decoding principles not used for
this scenario before. These methods are exemplified by specific
code constructions which improve existing codes with respect to
error probability, decoding complexity and codeword length.
Index Terms—Physical Unclonable Functions, Generalized
Concatenated Codes, Reed–Muller Codes, Reed–Solomon Codes
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptographic applications require random, unique and un-
predictable keys. Since most cryptosystems need to access the
key several times, it usually has to be stored permanently,
which is a potential vulnerability regarding security. Imple-
menting secure key generation and storage is therefore an
important and challenging task.
A Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a, typically
digital, circuit that possesses an intrinsic randomness due to
process variations during manufacturing and can therefore be
used to generate a key. This key can be reproduced on demand.
However, the PUF output when reproducing a key varies,
which can be interpreted as errors. Thus, error correction must
be used in order to compensate this effect. Previous work
on this topic used standard constructions, e.g. an ordinary
concatenated scheme of a BCH and Repetition code in [1].
In this paper, we extend our results from [2] and propose code
constructions based on generalized concatenated, Reed–Muller
and Reed–Solomon codes for the application with PUFs, which
have advantages with respect to decoding complexity, error
correction capability and code length. The paper first describes
PUFs and explains how coding theory is applied to realize key
generation and reproduction using PUFs. Section III describes
methods and codes suitable for this scenario. Finally, specific
code constructions, improving those commonly used for PUFs,
exemplify these methods in Section IV. We summarize the
results in the last section.
II. PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS
In [3], a PUF is described as a physical entity which uses
an input (challenge) in order to produce an output (response),
where a challenge can result in different responses when
applied to a certain PUF instance several times. The dis-
tance of two such responses is called intra-distance1. Reasons
for these varying responses are random noise, measurement
1With distance we mean the Hamming distance dH.
uncertainties, aging and changing environmental conditions
like temperature or supply voltage. A small response intra-
distance is preferred, since there is a need for reproducibility of
responses. The distance of the responses of two different PUF
instances using the same challenge is called inter-distance,
and results from variations during the manufacturing process.
This measure gives us the distinguishability of different PUF
instances, which is preferred to be large. Unclonable means the
hardness of manufacturing two PUFs with the same challenge-
response-behavior. There are many possibilities to realize
PUFs, e.g. delay-based (e.g. Ring Oscillator PUFs) or memory-
based (e.g. SRAM PUFs). An overview of popular types can
be found in [3].
PUFs can be used in order to realize secure key generation
and storage for cryptographic applications. Due to static ran-
domness over the PUFs lifetime, it is possible to regenerate a
key repeatedly on demand instead of storing it permanently. As
described above, PUF responses are not exactly reproducible
and therefore a response cannot be used as key directly. Hence,
methods of coding theory must be used.
One way to realize key reproduction is the Code-Offset
Construction [4] (cf. Figure 1). First, for a given challenge
a response r is generated by the PUF (I). The Helper Data
Generation (II) subtracts a random codeword c of a given
code C(n, k, d) from r and stores the result e = r − c in the
Helper Data Storage (III). Afterwards, the response r can be
deleted. Hence, if an attacker is able to read this storage, he is
left with an uncertainty as large as the number of codewords.
PUF
I
r′ = c+ e + e′
Helper
Data Ge-
neration
II
r = c+ e e
Helper
Data
Storage
III
e
Key
Repro-
duction
IV
rˆ = cˆ+ e
Hash
V
Key
Figure 1. Key Generation and Reproduction in PUFs.
For regenerating the original response, the same challenge
must be used to obtain a response r′ which is likely to differ
slightly from r. For most PUFs, this can be interpreted as an
additive error r′ = r+ e′ = c+ e+ e′, resulting from a binary
symmetric channel (BSC) with crossover probability p, where
p is given by the PUF. If wtH (e′) = dH (r, r′) is within the
error correction capabilities of the code, the Key Reproduction
(IV ) procedure is able to reproduce the first-time response r
by decoding r′ − e = c+ e+ e′ − e = c+ e′ with a decoder
of the code C(n, k, d) (decoding result cˆ).
Other possibilities for implementing key reproduction are
the Syndrome Construction [4], Index-Based Syndrome Coding
[5], Complementary Index-Based Syndrome Coding [6] and
Differential Sequence Coding [7]. One main challenge is to
find good codes that can be used for key reproduction.
If an attacker is able to read e from the helper data storage,
his uncertainty about the response r is equal to the uncertainty
of c, namely 2k codewords. Hence, the uncertainty of the
extracted key cannot be larger than the dimension of the
used code. Also, this uncertainty is even smaller due to the
fact that the PUF responses themselves are not necessarily
independent and uniformly distributed. Since we want to obtain
a uniformly distributed cryptographic key, rˆ must be hashed
by a cryptographic hash function (V ) before it can be used.
The combination of key reproduction and a hash function is
usually referred to as Fuzzy Extractor [8].
III. CODE CONSTRUCTIONS
Code design for key reproduction in PUFs is analog to
standard problems in coding theory for a given channel, e.g. a
BSC with crossover probability p. A typical goal is to design a
code with a block error probability Perr smaller than a certain
threshold. The dimension of the code must be at least the
length of the key that should be generated. Also, the designed
codes must be binary. The length of the codewords can be
chosen arbitrarily, but for generating one key, at least as many
bits as the codeword length have to be extracted from the PUF,
which determines the size of the PUF. Since the decoder is
usually part of an embedded security device, the decoding
method must be easy to implement in hardware. Here, we
describe suitable construction and decoding methods.
A. Generalized Concatenated Codes
The authors of [9] found that concatenated codes are advis-
able for implementing key reproduction. Instead of ordinary
concatenated codes, we propose using Generalized Concate-
nated (GC) codes as introduced in [10] and [11]. A GC code
with given n and d contains more codewords and hence has a
higher code rate than an ordinary concatenated code with the
same parameters.
The main idea of GC codes is to partition an inner code B(1)
of length ni into multiple levels of subcodes. Let B(i)j denote
the j-th subcode at partition level i. The goal is to create parti-
tions such that the minimum distances of the subcodes increase
strictly monotonically from level to level in the partition tree.
Each codeword of B(1) can be uniquely determined using a
numeration of the partition. This numeration is protected by
outer codes. Code A(i) of length no denotes the outer code
which protects the numeration of the partition from level i to
level i + 1. For a detailed description of GC codes, we refer
to [11].
B. Reed–Muller Codes
A Reed–Muller (RM) code RM(r,m) of order r with
r ≤ m is a binary linear code with parameters n = 2m,
k =
∑r
i=0
(
m
i
)
and d = 2m−r. It can be defined recursively
using the Plotkin Construction [11]:
RM(r,m) :=
{
(a|a+ b) :
a ∈ RM(r,m− 1)
b ∈ RM(r − 1,m− 1)
}
with RM(0,m) := C(2m, 1, 2m) (Repetition code) and
RM(m− 1,m) := C(2m, 2m − 1, 2) (Parity Check code) for
all m. RM(1,m) codes are called Simplex codes.
RM codes work well for PUF key reproduction due to
an easily implementable decoding, which can also be done
recursively using Algorithm 1, which can correct up to τ errors
and δ erasures if 2τ + δ < d. Erasures are treated as third
symbol ⊗ besides 0 and 1, and the operation + is extended
such that ⊗ + x = x + ⊗ := ⊗ for all x ∈ {0, 1,⊗}. Within
the description of Algorithm 1, + is applied component-wise.
Decoding of the repetition and parity check codes (base cases
of the recursion) works as usual by ignoring all code positions
with erasures. Alternatively, RM codes can be defined as GC
codes and decoded using the algorithm described in [12].
Algorithm 1 Recursive RM(r,m) Decoder [13]
Require: y = (ya|yb) = (a+ ea|a + b+ eb) ∈ {0, 1,⊗}2
m
1: Decode ya + yb = b+ ea + eb in RM(r − 1, m− 1) ⇒ bˆ
2: Dec. yb + bˆ = a+(b+ bˆ)+ ea + eb in RM(r,m− 1) ⇒ aˆ1
3: Dec. ya = a+ ea in RM(r,m− 1) ⇒ aˆ2
4: Find i ∈ {1, 2} such that dH(y, (aˆi|aˆi + bˆ)) minimal
5: return (aˆi|aˆi + bˆ)
Using RM codes in the PUF scenario is reasonable because
Algorithm 1 can be implemented efficiently. Since it can han-
dle both errors and erasures, it also works in combination with
Generalized Minimum Distance decoding (cf. Section III-D).
Furthermore, RM codes are proper for partitioning because
RM(ri,m) ⊆ RM(rj ,m) for all ri ≤ rj and partitioning of
linear block codes into cosets of a linear subcode can be done
easily [11]. This property makes them suitable in a GC code.
However, RM codes are not maximum distance separable.
Also, the dimension k cannot be chosen arbitrarily. RM codes
have been used before for key reproduction in PUFs [6], [14].
C. Reed–Solomon Codes
Reed–Solomon (RS) codes are one of the most commonly
used codes in applications of coding theory due to the existence
of efficient decoding algorithms. We describe the basics of
RS codes according to [11]. Let Fq be a finite field and α a
generator of F∗q .
Definition 1 (Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT)). For a
polynomial c(x) ∈ Fq[x] with deg c(x) < n, the DFT
C(x) = F {c(x)} s ❝c(x) is defined by
Cj = n
−1c(α−j) ∀j ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}
and the inverse DFT c˜(x) := F−1 {C(x)} ❝ sC(x) is
c˜i = C(α
i) ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}
Definition 2 (Reed–Solomon codes). A Reed–Solomon code
over a field Fq is defined as
RS(q;n, k) =
{
c(x) ❝ sC(x) : degC(x) < k
}
RS codes are maximum distance separable (MDS), that
means d = n−k+1. There are several algorithms for decoding
RS codes both for decoding up to half the minimum distance
and beyond. An overview of the most important decoding
methods for RS codes can be found in [15].
In this paper, we use the method of Power Decoding [16]
which is easily implementable using Shift-Register Synthesis
and can correct beyond half the minimum distance for small
code rates. Since we use RS codes with small rates in our
construction, this method suits perfectly. The idea of Power
Decoding is to power the received word r(x) = c(x) + e(x)
with some positive integer ℓ:
r
[ℓ](x) :=
n−1∑
i=0
r
ℓ
ix
i =
n−1∑
i=0
(ci + ei)
ℓ
x
i =
n−1∑
i=0
(
ℓ∑
j=0
(
ℓ
j
)
c
j
ie
ℓ−j
i
)
x
i
=
n−1∑
i=0
(cℓi + e˜
ℓ
i)x
i = c[ℓ](x) + e˜[ℓ](x)
such that for some i, ei = 0 yields e˜i = 0, but not necessarily
the other way round. Hence, wtH(e˜[ℓ](x)) ≤ wtH(e(x)) and
the indices of the nonzero coefficients of e˜[ℓ](x) are a subset
of those of e(x). From the properties of the DFT, we know
that c[ℓ](x) ❝ s(C(x))ℓ. Since degC(x) ≤ k − 1 implies
deg(C(x))ℓ ≤ ℓ(k−1), we know that c[ℓ](x) is a codeword of
RS(q;n, k(ℓ) := ℓ(k− 1)+1) for all ℓ with ℓ(k− 1)+1 ≤ n.
We denote the maximum ℓ such that this inequality is fulfilled
by ℓmax. This approach is usually referred to as Virtual
Interleaving. Since we know that the errors in all received
words r[ℓ](x) are at the same positions, collaborative decoding
as described in [17] can be used to improve the decoding
capability. It is shown in [16, Section V] that, except for a
negligible probability of decoding failure, Power Decoding
using powers up to ℓ ≤ ℓmax can correct up to
τℓ :=
⌊
2ℓn− ℓ(ℓ+ 1)k + ℓ(ℓ− 1)
2(ℓ+ 1)
⌋
(1)
errors. It can also be shown that ℓmax is upper bounded by
ℓmax ≤
√
(k + 3)2 + 8(k − 1)(n− 1)− (k + 3)
2(k − 1)
(2)
Combining (1) and (2), we obtain a maximum error correction
radius as shown in Figure 2. Note that for low rate codes the
algorithm can correct far beyond half the minimum distance.
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Figure 2. Maximum Decoding Radius for Power Decoding RS Codes.
Most RS decoding algorithms can be modified such that they
can correct erasures and errors [11]. This modification has the
same effect as decoding a punctured RS code. Assuming that
when transmitting a codeword from RS(q;n, k), δ erasures
and τ errors occurred, we can simply transform the decoding
problem into correcting τ errors in RS(q;n − δ, k). So
decoding is successful if δ + 2τ < d = n − k + 1. However,
since the rate of the code used in the transformed problem is
larger than the original, Power Decoding might not be helpful
when a lot of erasures occur.
The main benefit of RS codes is their flexibility. The param-
eter k (respectively d) can be chosen arbitrarily. Additionally,
Power Decoding can be applied. Finally, RS codes have better
decoding properties than RM codes. However, if the same
decoding algorithm should be used for all outer codes, the
codes must be defined over the same finite field Fqm . For
the dimensions of the inner codes of two subsequent partition
levels j and j− 1, it must be kj−1− kj = m, where m = 2m
is the size of the field. Since no ≤ 2m, m must be chosen
sufficiently large.
D. Generalized Minimum Distance Decoding
Generalized Minimum Distance (GMD) decoding (cf. [18])
is a method to increase the number of correctable errors beyond
half the minimum distance by incrementally declaring the least
reliable positions of a received word to be erasures. Hence,
soft-information and error-erasure decoders are needed.
E. Maximum Likelihood Decoding
Maximum Likelihood (ML) decoding finds the most likely
codeword with respect to the received word. Thus, decoding
only fails if two or more codewords are equally likely. For
most codes, no sufficiently fast ML decoder exists, but it is
applicable to codes with small dimension. Since the inner
codes of GC codes often fulfill this requirement, we use ML
decoders in order to decrease decoding failure probabilities of
the inner codes.
IV. CODE CONSTRUCTIONS USING GC CODES
In this section, we show how codes for key reproduction
in PUFs can be constructed using RM and RS codes in
combination with GC codes. First, we describe how codes
for PUFs can be constructed based on GC codes in general.
As a starting point, the desired codeword length n and a
dimension k which is at least the key size must be chosen.
If the information theoretic uncertainty of the source is small,
a larger k together with a hash function can be used to create an
output with good cryptographic properties. Next, two numbers
ni and no such that nino = n must be found, where ni denotes
the length of the inner codes and no denotes the length of the
outer codes. ni must be chosen large enough such that an inner
code with this length exists which can be partitioned easily.
The easiest way to define a partitioning is to take a linear code
and a linear subcode of it. Then, all distinct cosets of this
subcode form a partitioning of the code. If the large code has
dimension ki and the subcode has dimension ki+1 < ki, then
the number of partitions is qki−ki+1 (here, we only consider
binary inner codes, so q = 2). Afterwards, good outer codes
with length no have to be chosen to protect the partition indices
for each partition level. The dimensions of the codes must be
chosen such that their sum is equal to the desired dimension
k of the entire code. Usually, the dimensions are chosen such
that they increase with the partition level.
We already described in Section III-B why RM codes are
suitable as inner codes. Due to their easily implementable
decoding algorithms, they can also be used as outer codes.
An example construction using only RM codes is given in
Section IV-A, which has better properties than the codes
commonly used for error correction in PUFs. However their
dimension cannot be chosen arbitrarily, which restricts their
use as outer codes. Therefore, in Section IV-C we also show
how RS codes can be used instead.
A. Reed-Muller Example Construction
In [1], a design for cryptographic key generators based on
PUFs was introduced, using a concatenation of a (318, 174, 35)
BCH code and a (7, 1, 7) Repetition code in order to generate
a 128 bit key with error probability Perr = 10−9. The paper
considers error models with BSC crossover probabilities p
ranging from 0.12 to 0.14, leading to different PUF entropies.
The higher this entropy is, the fewer bits are needed to hash
to the same key size. For a minimum code dimension, we
consider the maximum entropy case with p = 0.14. For a fair
comparison to [1], the block error probability Perr should be
roughly 10−9 for a 128 bit key. Thus, we have to choose a
code with dimension ≥ 128 and aim for a block length less
than the one used in [1], namely 2226.
We give a more detailed description and analysis of the
example code construction which we introduced in [2]. The
example improves existing schemes in code length, block error
probability and easiness of the implementation. We choose a
generalized concatenation of an inner (16, 5, 8) Simplex code
B(1) and RM codes of length 128 as outer codes A(i). Hence,
we obtain a code of length 128 · 16 = 2048, i.e. it can be
represented as a matrix with 128 rows, each containing a
codeword of the Simplex code.
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
←− A(1)(128, 8, 64)
←− A(2)(128, 99, 8)
B(1)(16, 5, 8)
B
(2)
0000(16, 1, 16)
B
(3)
0000,0
0
B
(3)
0000,1
1
0000
B
(2)
1111(16, 1, 16)
B
(3)
1111,0
0
B
(3)
1111,1
1
1111
Figure 3. Partition of the inner code B(1)(16, 5, 8).
The inner code B(1) is partitioned into 16 disjoint subcodes
B
(2)
i with parameters (16, 1, 16), e.g. B
(2)
0000 can be the repeti-
tion code of length 16 and all other elements of the partition
are its distinct cosets. The enumeration i ∈ {0000, . . . , 1111}
is then protected by four RM(1, 7) codes, one for each bit.
Since the subcodes B(2)i contain exactly two elements each,
we can again partition them into subcodes containing only
one element, B(2)i,0 and B
(2)
i,1 . The enumeration {0, 1} is then
protected by a RM(4, 7) code. The partition tree is illustrated
in Figure 3. Thus, we can encode 4 · 8+99 = 131 ≥ 128 bits.
Encoding is illustrated in Figure 4 and explained in Table I.
A detailed description of the decoding process is visualized
in Figure 5 and explained in Table II. The soft information
mentioned in Steps (c) and (g) is obtained from the number
of errors corrected in Steps (a) and (e) respectively.
2Note that the resulting code has dimension 131 = 32+99, where 32 = 4·8
bits are encoded using A(1) and 99 bits are encoded using A(2) .
I
8
4
(a)
II
99
1
(b)
III
128
4
IV
128
1
(c)
(c)
V
128
16
Figure 4. Illustration of the encoding steps (Legend: cf. table I).
Block/Step Description
I (8 × 4)-matrix containing 32 information bits2 .
(a) Column-wise encoding in A(1) = RM(1, 7) =
C(128, 8, 64).
III Result of Step (a). (128 × 4)-matrix, whose columns are
codwords of A(1) . Each row provides first partition index i
(4 bits) for encoding Step (c) (chooses B(2)i ).
II (99 × 1)-matrix containing 99 information bits2 .
(b) Encoding in A(2) = RM(4, 7) = C(128, 99, 8).
IV Result of Step (b). (128 × 1)-matrix which is codword of
A(2) . Each row provides second partition index j (1 bit) for
encoding Step (c) (chooses B(3)i,j ).
(c) Takes row-wise partition indices i (from III) and j (from
IV ) and writes the codeword contained by B(3)i,j (note that
this code contains only one codeword) in the corresponding
row of V .
V GC codeword (length n = 128 · 16 = 2048) obtained by
encoding the k = 131 bits from I and II .
Table I
LEGEND TO FIGURE 4 (ENCODING).
B. Analysis of the RM-Example
We derive an upper bound on the block error probability
Perr of the code described in Section III-D. For GC codes,
decoding is realized in several steps. We look at the events
S1, . . . , Sr, where Si is the event that decoding in step i fails.
Since the decoder is only successful if all steps work properly,
we can give an upper bound for Perr using the Union Bound:
Perr = P
(
r⋃
i=1
Si
)
≤
r∑
i=1
P (Si) (3)
Hence, the block error probability is upper-bounded by the
sum of the error probabilities of each step. In the example
from Section III-D, we can group the decoding process into
two major steps, namely S1 consisting of steps (a)− (d) and
S2 with (e) − (h) (cf. Table II). P (S1) can be calculated
by transforming the BSC with p = 0.14 into a binary error
and erasure channel by ML decoding of the inner Simplex
(16, 5, 8) code. By simulation, we obtain the following pa-
rameters of this transformed channel:
P (error) = 0.020698,
P (erasure) = 0.155532.
The error-erasure decoder of the outer RM(1, 7) =
C(128, 8, 64) code can decode correctly, if 2τ+δ < 64, where
τ is the number of errors and δ is the number of erasures.
Using this condition, we obtain
P (S1) = P (2τ + δ ≥ 64)
=
128∑
i=0
P (δ = i) P (2τ ≥ 64− i | δ = i)
≈ 9.51 · 10−12 (4)
The probability P (S2) can be calculated similarly. It turns out
that P (S2) ≈ 1.48 · 10−9. Using these results, we obtain the
following upper bound on Perr:
Perr ≤ 9.51 · 10
−12 + 1.48 · 10−9 ≈ 1.49 · 10−9
However, this probability can be further decreased by using
GMD decoding. This effect is not easy to analyze analytically,
but has a large impact on the error probability. Simulations
have shown that the actual block error probability is given by:
Perr ≈ 5.37 · 10
−10 (5)
Compared to the code construction used in [1], we obtain a
smaller block error probability using GC codes. We have also
decreased the codeword length from 2226 to 2048. Another
advantage of our construction is that decoding is easier to
implement, since we only use codes with decoders working
over F2. Table III summarizes the improvements.
I
128
16
(a)
II
128
16
(b)
III
128
4
(c)
IV
128
4
(d)
(e)
V
128
16
(f)
V I
128
1
(g)
V II
128
1
(h)
Figure 5. Illustration of the decoding steps (Legend: cf. table II).
C. Reed-Solomon Construction
The result of Section IV-A provides a code construction
which improves commonly used coding schemes for key
reproduction in PUFs. However, the use of RM codes as outer
codes in the GC scheme is not as flexible as sometimes desired.
Thus, we show how GC codes can be constructed using RS
codes as outer codes and improve the code construction from
Section IV-C in the code length.
The possible length no of the outer RS codes is upper
bounded by their field size, which again is restricted by the
number of partitionings. This means that the length of the inner
codes ni must be sufficiently large, such that at each partition
Block/Step Description
I (128 × 16)-matrix containing the received word. Rows are
codewords of B(1) = RM(1, 4) (Simplex code) plus error.
(a) Row-wise ML decoding in B(1). Result: c ∈ B(1) or ⊗16
(erasure if closest codeword not unique)
II Result of Step (a). Rows are codewords of B(1) or ⊗16
(b) Remapping of every row (codewords of B(1)) to index (4
bits) of the partition which contains the row. If erasure, result:
⊗4.
III Result of Step (b). Rows are ∈ {0, 1}4 ∪ {⊗4}.
(c) Column-wise error-erasure decoding (optional: GMD us-
ing soft information obtained from step (a)) in A(1) =
RM(1, 7) = C(128, 8, 64). If decoding fails: Declare
failure of algorithm.
IV Result of Step (c). Columns are ∈ RM(1, 7). Rows give
indices i (4 bits) which specify in which partition B(2)i the
rows must be decoded in the second part of the algorithm.
(d) Extraction of the first 32 = 4 · 8 information bits (each
column of IV is a codeword of a C(128, 8, 64) code which
corresponds to exactly one information word of length 8).
(e) Row-wise ML decoding in B(2)i , where i denotes the parti-
tion index for each row given by the corresponding row of
IV .
V Result of Step (e). Rows are codewords of B(2)i or ⊗16 (if
closest codeword not unique).
(f) Remapping of every row (codewords of B(2)i ) to index j (1
bit) of the partition B(3)i,j of B
(2)
i which contains the row. If
erasure: ⊗.
V I Result of Step (f).
(g) Error-erasure decoding (optional: GMD using soft informa-
tion obtained from step (e)) of the column in A(2) =
RM(4, 7) = C(128, 99, 8). If decoding fails: Declare
failure of algorithm.
V II Result of Step (g). Column contains codeword of A(2) .
(h) Extraction of remaining 99 information bits which corre-
spond to the A(2) = C(128, 99, 8) codeword in Block V II .
Table II
LEGEND TO FIGURE 5 (DECODING).
level i, partitions of B(i) in more subcodes than the length no
of the outer codes are possible.
We first illustrate how much the code rate can be reduced
when using RS codes in a concatenated scheme by giving
an example of an ordinarily concatenated code based on RS
codes. The example uses a RM(1, 5) = C(32, 6, 16) code as
inner code which transforms the BSC with p = 0.14 into a
binary error and erasure channel with P (error) = 0.003170
and P (erasure) = 0.017605 using ML decoding. As outer
code, we use a RS(26;n, k) code with n ≤ 26 = 64 and k =
22 because the overall dimension of the code must be 6k ≥
128 bits. If we choose n = 64, we obtain a code with length
n = 64 · 32 = 2048 and we can calculate that Perr ≈ 6.79 ·
10−37 using the same equation as (4). Since this probability is
by far smaller than necessary, we can use the flexibility of RS
codes and reduce n arbitrarily. This is easy to realize with the
same decoder as for the RS(26; 64, k) code by declaring some
codeword positions to be erasures. If we use a RS(26; 36, 22)
code, the code length can be reduced to 1152 and we obtain
a block error probability of Perr ≈ 1.19 · 10−10. Note that we
have already reduced the code length by half compared to the
construction in [1].
In the following, we give an example that reduces the code
length even more by using GC codes. We partition an extended
BCH [11] code B(1)(32, 11, 12) into thirty-two B(2)i (32, 6, 16)
codes (i ∈ {0, 1}5), which we again partition in B(3)i,j (32, 1, 32)
codes (j ∈ {0, 1}5). As outer codes we use RS codes to
protect the partitions, e.g. an A(1) = RS(25; 32, 2, 31) code
to protect the partitioning from level 1 to level 2 and an
A(2) = RS(25; 32, 19, 12) code between levels 2 and 3.
The partition from level 3 to level 4 is protected by an
A(3) = RM(32, 26, 4) code. The partition tree for this
example is visualized in Figure 6. Encoding and decoding is
done similarly to the RM example in Section IV-A.
. . .
. . .
.
.
.
. . .
. . .
.
.
.
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
←− A(1)(25; 32, 2, 31)
←− A(2)(25; 32, 19, 12)
←− A(3)(21; 32, 24, 4)
B(1)(32, 11, 12)
B
(2)
00000(32, 6, 16)
B
(3)
00000,00000(32, 1, 32)
B
(4)
00000,000000,1
0
B
(4)
00000,000000,0
1
00000
B
(3)
00000,11111(32, 1, 32)
11111
00000
B
(2)
11111(32, 6, 16)
11111
Figure 6. Partition of the inner extended BCH code B(1)(32, 11, 12).
We analyze the decoding capabilities of the code step by
step. In Step 1, ML decoding in B(1)(32, 11, 12) transforms
the channel in a binary error and erasure channel3 with
P (error) = 0.037808 and P (erasure) = 0.174488. Decoding
up to half the minimum distance in the outer code would leave
us with P (S1) ≈ 1.03 ·10−8, which is too high. But since the
RS(25; 32, 2, 31) code has a low rate, we can apply Power
Decoding (cf. Section III-C) and obtain an error probability of
P (S1) ≈ 1.48 · 10
−11
.
Step 2 transforms the BSC into a binary error and era-
sure channel with P (error) = 0.0032167 and P (erasure) =
0.0175397. Hence, decoding in RS(25; 32, 19, 12) yields an
error probability of P (S2) ≈ 3.11 · 10−10.
The last step has P (S3) ≈ 2.13 · 10−11. Hence, the overall
block error probability is upper bounded by
Perr ≤
(3)
P (S1) + P (S2) + P (S3) ≈ 3.47 · 10
−10
Thus, the example satisfies the constraints and reduces the code
length to n = 32 · 32 = 1024.
V. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
We explained how coding theory is used for reproducing
cryptographic keys using PUFs. Furthermore, we proposed
code constructions and decoding methods which improve ex-
isting coding schemes for PUFs and illustrated these by giving
examples. Table III summarizes the properties of the example
constructions. It can be seen that our approach can achieve
significantly reduced codelengths, block error probabilities or
decoding complexity. In future work, more methods from
coding theory can be examined for suitability in this setting.
3The parameters of the transformed channel have been calculated by
simulation of ML decoding of the inner code.
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Code (Section) Perr Length Largest Field4
BCH Rep. [1] 10−9 2226 F28 (BCH)
GC RM (IV-A) 5.37 · 10−10 2048 F2
RS (IV-C) 6.79 · 10−37 2048 F26
RS (IV-C) 1.19 · 10−10 1152 F26
GC RS (IV-C) 3.47 · 10−10 1024 F25
Table III
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE CODE CONSTRUCTIONS.
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